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Mitigating systemic risk in OTC derivative markets
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has demonstrated that turmoil in OTC derivative markets can exacerbate ﬁ  nancial 
distress. One of the challenges policymakers currently face, is to mitigate the risks these markets pose 
to the ﬁ  nancial system. Inducing a shift towards more central clearing is an important step in the right 
direction as it tempers counterparty risk and increases transparency. However, this will only be part of the 
solution as risk management systems of Central Counterparties (CCPs) are not necessarily equipped 
to clear all types of derivative contracts. In addition, central clearing concentrates risk and may actually 
increase systemic risk. By implication, it is crucial that CCPs have robust risk management systems 
in place. Furthermore, enhancing the safety and transparency of bilateral clearing also merits attention as 
a certain share of OTC derivative trades will remain bilaterally cleared. Given the international character 
of OTC derivative markets, coordination between national supervisors and regulators is crucial for any 
initiative to succeed.   
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O
ver the past decades we have witnessed 
the advent of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative markets. According to the latest 
BIS estimates,1 the notional value of outstanding 
OTC contracts exceeded the staggering amount 
of 600 trillion USD. Although derivatives have 
contributed to ﬁ   nancial innovation and market 
efﬁ  ciency, the past years have also demonstrated that 
these markets are capable of exacerbating ﬁ  nancial 
distress. Not surprisingly, this is nowadays a topic 
of heated debates among policy makers, market 
participants and academics worldwide. Consensus 
exists that OTC markets have to become safer, more 
resilient, and more transparent. Rightfully, a crucial 
role is envisaged for Central Counterparties (CCPs) 
in accomplishing this. However, notwithstanding 
the fact that CCPs can indisputably contribute to 
reducing systemic risk, they imply a potential 
concentration risk as well. These risks can become 
systemic if a CCP is large enough. Therefore, we 
should make sure that these risks are adequately 
mitigated. Furthermore, although inducing a shift 
towards more CCP clearing is a step in the right 
direction, it is merely a partial solution for systemic 
risk in OTC derivative markets, as there will always 
remain a bilaterally cleared market. By implication, 
enhancing the safety and transparency of the 
latter merits as much attention. The key levers 
policy makers can pull are capital requirements 
and transparency which, given the international 
interconnectedness of derivative trading, should 
be harmonised in a worldwide common regulatory 
framework.  
1| CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES
  AS PART OF THE SOLUTION
Turmoil in OTC derivative markets can adversely 
inﬂ  uence ﬁ  nancial stability in at least two ways. 
Firstly, a default of a large dealer might spread 
signiﬁ   cant losses to other (systemic) ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Secondly, fear for a failure of a large 
dealer – whether justiﬁ  ed or not – might cause a ﬂ  ight 
out of its derivatives portfolio, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of an actual failure. With respect to 
both issues, the opaque nature of OTC derivative 
markets is an important contributor to ﬁ  nancial 
distress. Against this background, policymakers 
worldwide – among which the Dutch Central Bank – 
have called for an increased standardisation of OTC 
derivative contracts to induce a shift towards more 
central clearing. There are several ways in which more 
CCP clearing can mitigate risk in the ﬁ  nancial system.
A CCP REDUCES COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK 
A CCP takes over the counterparty risk management 
of its clearing members. In the CCP model, a clearing 
member has to deal with only one highly credible 
counterparty instead of with many counterparties 
with different risk proﬁ  les. On the other hand, 
market participants in a bilaterally cleared market 
have to assess every counterparty individually. 
Furthermore, in case of a default, the unwinding 
of positions is likely to become a lingering process 
accompanied by an extended period of uncertainty. 
Also, the parties involved will have to look out for 
their own interests, thereby most likely incurring 
signiﬁ  cant legal and administrative costs. 
As a central counterparty to a number of market 
participants, a CCP has the possibility to net on 
a multilateral instead of a bilateral basis. Multilateral 
netting is efﬁ  cient as it has the potential to reduce 
the total exposures in the system more than bilateral 
netting does. Nevertheless, a precondition for these 
efﬁ  ciency gains to be realised is that the number 
of market participants opting for central clearing is 
large compared to the number of those continuing 
to net bilaterally (see for example Dufﬁ  e and Zhu).2
Especially with respect to credit default swap (CDS) 
contracts, a CCP might not always be able to 
mitigate counterparty risk fully, as these markets 
are typically characterised by relatively few dealers 
holding relatively large positions, often of limited 
liquidity. Furthermore, risk management becomes 
more challenging for CCPs when only certain asset 
classes (for example credit CDSs or interest rate 
swaps – IRS) are centrally cleared, as this reduces 
netting opportunities.  
…ENFORCES COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS…
In a bilaterally cleared market, derivative traders 
may be confronted with commercial pressures to 
1  http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0911.htm
2 Dufﬁ  e (D.) and Zhu (H.) (2010): “Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?”, Graduate School of Business Standford University, March.
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refrain from requiring initial margins. According to 
ISDA,3 23% of bilateral trades are not collateralised, 
and for the remaining 77% it is unclear to what 
extent positions are covered by collateral. A CCP 
enhances safety in derivative markets by not only 
requiring variation margin, but also initial margin 
and clearing fund contributions. Initial margin 
is provided by clearing members to the CCP to 
cover potential future credit exposures. Indeed, 
clearing members provide resources to be used in 
case of their own default. This is attractive from 
an economic perspective as ‘the polluter pays’. 
The second line of defence in case of default of 
a clearing member is the CCP’s clearing fund; 
a CCP requires clearing fund contributions from 
it’s participants to cover any losses and liquidity 
pressures resulting from a default of one of them. 
As such, uncollateralised losses are shared among 
clearing members. Furthermore, CPSS-IOSCO4 has 
recommended that risk management systems of 
a CCP should be designed in such a way that a default 
of its largest clearing member can be withstood 
(at any moment). 
Nevertheless, market participants in a bilaterally 
cleared market are also able to mutualise loss 
sharing, for example by using insurance in the form 
of a third-party guarantee. In this way, the cost of 
these guarantees are spread across the client base. 
Conceptually, this kind of insurance also centralises 
risk assessment and risk mitigation. Unfortunately, 
this is not common practice in bilaterally 
cleared markets. 
Finally, an important risk reducing feature of a CCP 
is that it calculates new collateral requirements at 
least on a daily basis, and monitors whether the 
collateral is actually deposited. In a bilaterally cleared 
market this is not necessarily the case. In fact, while 
in bilaterally cleared markets currently 23% of the 
risk is not covered by collateral, for centrally cleared 
products the uncovered risk is 0% because of initial 
and variations margin requirements and clearing 
fund contributions. In short, in a centrally cleared 
world, counterparty risk can be more convincingly 
mitigated than in a bilaterally cleared world. 
…AND INCREASES TRANSPARENCY 
Pre and post trade transparency enhance market 
efﬁ  ciency and reduce market risk. This is especially 
valuable in OTC markets, which are opaque by nature. 
CCPs can improve transparency of OTC prices 
and offer insight into which counterparties have 
systemically relevant positions. CCPs can disclose 
this information on a day-to-day basis. This kind of 
information is highly valuable to macroprudential 
supervisors. It has to be noted though that whether 
a CCP actually discloses this data depends on 
the reporting practices of the CCP in question. 
Strict reporting requirements therefore need to be 
enforced. 
Trade repositories (a relatively recent phenomenon 
which functions as a data warehouse for OTC 
contracts) have been proposed as an alternative. 
Unfortunately they currently only provide 
information on nominal values, and do not disclose 
this information on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, 
up till now CCPs are capable of realising a higher 
degree of transparency. 
In sum, a CCP can contribute to ﬁ  nancial stability 
and standardisation of OTC derivative contracts 
through mitigating counterparty risk, multilateral 
netting, requiring initial margins and clearing fund 
contributions, and enhancing transparency.   
2| CENTRAL CLEARING – 
  A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
  BUT NOT THE HOLY GRAIL
Although a shift towards more central clearing 
should be advocated based on the arguments 
outlined above, CCPs are no panacea for all products 
and all markets. A CCP is typically attractive for 
a market with highly liquid, standardised contracts. 
After all, counterparty credit risk is lower for liquid 
products than for illiquid products, as the former 
3  ISDA: International swaps and derivatives Association.
4  CPSS-IOSCO (2004): “Recommendations for Central Counterparties”, November.
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can be relatively easily liquidated after a credit 
event. Adequately covering these risks might result 
in margin requirements which render central 
clearing overly expensive for market participants 
(although it seems questionable whether products 
are economically viable in case they prove to be too 
expensive to be centrally cleared). Therefore, a CCP 
should only clear those contracts with substantial 
trading volumes. Another condition for CCP clearing 
is that the credit quality of participants is relatively 
uniform. Should the available margins and clearing 
fund assets be insufﬁ  cient to cover the losses in 
case of a default, not only the polluter but also the 
survivors end up paying the bill. 
CONCENTRATION RISKS SHOULD BE MITIGATED 
AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
Notwithstanding the fact that a CCP takes over and 
mitigates counterparty risk by multilateral netting, 
it eliminates only part of it. In fact, counterparty 
risk is concentrated at the level of the CCP. In case 
of a large CCP, this concentration risk can become 
systemic. The direct effect of a CCP failure would 
then be that its counterparties, possibly systemic 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, are confronted with signiﬁ  cant 
losses. The indirect effect might be even more 
worrying: a loss of conﬁ  dence in central clearing 
in general, causing a ﬂ  ight out of CCPs. Needless to 
say, it is crucial that risk management systems of 
CCPs are robust, especially given the complex risk 
characteristics of OTC derivatives. In this context, 
a key concerns is to prevent regulatory arbitrage 
as competition between CCPs on risk management 
standards might signiﬁ  cantly impair the stability 
of the system. Therefore, the importance of an 
internationally consistent approach is obvious 
(the work of the OTC Regulators Forum and the 
CPSS-IOSCO recommendations for OTC derivative 
clearing are valuable means to this end).
In addition, all CCPs should have access to at least 
a certain minimum of central bank facilities. If a CCP 
ﬁ  nds itself confronted with a temporary liquidity 
shortage, access to intraday central bank liquidity lines 
could take the sting out of the tail, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of unnecessary ﬁ  nancial distress.      
3| ENHANCING THE SAFETY
  AND TRANSPARENCY OF OTC
  BILATERALLY CLEARED
  DERIVATIVES TRADES
Although a signiﬁ  cant share of derivative contracts 
will be cleared centrally going forward (partially as 
a result of regulatory reforms) this will not be the case 
for all contracts. Obviously, there will always remain 
derivative contracts which are simply not eligible for 
central clearing. On top of this, market participants 
in some cases may have incentives to prefer bilateral 
clearing to central clearing, as the safety provided by 
CCPs comes at a cost: initial margin requirements and 
mandatory clearing fund contributions. These costs 
might be perceived as a signiﬁ  cant burden, especially 
in times when liquidity is scarce. Arguably, even 
if national authorities would decide upon making 
central clearing of CCP eligible contracts mandatory, 
enforcement might prove to be difﬁ  cult. After all, 
the assessment of whether a derivative contract 
is not standardised because of the speciﬁ  c purpose 
it serves, or merely to circumvent the obligation to 
clear, is highly complex. Although it might seem that 
simply banning products that are not CCP eligible 
would resolve this issue, this solution has signiﬁ  cant 
drawbacks. The fact that OTC derivatives fulﬁ  l 
a non-negligible role in the ﬁ  nancial  system 
should not be ignored. Besides offering hedging 
possibilities to both ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
institutions which may not always be obtained 
through standardised contracts, these products 
have the potential to foster ﬁ  nancial innovation. 
When a new product is created, trading volumes 
can be expected to be thin initially. If it turns out 
that this product truly implies a valuable addition 
to the incumbent set of products, it most likely will 
become more liquid and eventually standardisable. 
Assuming that a certain share of contracts will 
always remain cleared bilaterally, enhancing the 
safety of OTC derivative markets is highly important 
besides stimulating central clearing and creating 
a sound regulatory oversight framework for CCPs. 
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The key issue regarding bilaterally cleared markets 
is that not only counterparty risk has to be taken 
into account in risk management practices, but 
also the additional risk that is posed to the ﬁ  nancial 
system. This additional risk can be seen as a negative 
externality, comparable to pollution. If left fully to the 
market, the outcome in terms of collateralisation will 
be below the social optimum. Although policymakers 
should be cautious not to unduly intervene in 
markets, the existence of (negative) externalities is 
a valid ground for some degree of intervention.   
 
STRENGTHENING CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR BILATERALLY CLEARED TRADES
In order to stimulate a shift towards central clearing 
Basel II attaches a zero capital weight to derivative 
positions cleared by a CCP. Currently, the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision is proposing 
enhancements to the capital requirements for 
counterparty credit risk exposures arising from 
(among others) derivate trading.5 The basic idea is 
straightforward: the capital weight for derivatives 
that are bilaterally cleared will be higher than those 
for derivatives cleared through CCPs. In this way, 
the additional risk the former poses to the system 
can – at least to some extent – be taken into account. 
One important additional beneﬁ  t of the proposals is 
that by increasing the cost of bilateral clearing, they 
provide an incentive to clear derivative positions 
centrally. Currently, the beneﬁ  ts of a CCP do not 
always outweigh the costs, which might change 
with the introduction of relatively high capital 
5  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009): “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector”, December.
6 FSA  & HM Treasury (2009): “Reforming OTC derivative markets, a UK perspective”, December.
7  As of 2006 DTCC acts as a trade repository for the trade in credit derivatives, and since January 2010 TriOptima is the trade repository for interest rate derivatives.
8  Trade repositories for other derivatives still have to be established. 
requirements for non-cleared derivatives. However, 
capital requirements for OTC trades should not be 
excessively penal (as also mentioned by the FSA 
and HM Treasury in their joint paper).6 They should 
rather reﬂ  ect the excess risk that is posed to the 
system. Measures that go beyond this are likely to 
unduly impair market efﬁ  ciency. For these measures 
to be successful it is a condition sine qua non that they 
are implemented in an internationally consistent 
manner and in a timely fashion. 
 
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY 
One of the key factors contributing to systemic risk 
resulting from OTC derivative markets is a lack of 
transparency. As mentioned earlier, the increase use 
of trade repositories have been proposed to reduce 
the opaque nature of these markets. Although 
trade repositories are already operational for some 
products,7  the scope, quality and accessibility of 
these institutions should be further improved.8 
Currently, trade repositories disclose merely a bare 
minimum of information. In order to truly address 
the opaqueness of OTC markets, trade repositories 
should disclose their information – including both 
pre- and post-trade data – to the relevant supervisors 
at least. Whether these data should also be made 
public is still subject to heated debate, since this will 
potentially impair proprietary trading strategies. As 
is often the case, policymakers face the challenge 
of striking a balance between making markets safer 
on the one hand and not unduly hampering market 
efﬁ  ciency and innovation on the other. 
Policy proposals to induce a shift towards more central clearing should be advocated. A CCP offers multiple advantages 
compared to bilateral clearing. However, increased use of CCPs creates potential concentration risks as well, which may 
become systemic if a CCP is large enough. Therefore it is crucial that CCPs comply to (inter)national recommendations and 
guidelines for risk management standards. Clearly, CCPs should only clear those contracts for which they can adequately 
manage the risks. This implies that there will always remain a bilaterally cleared market, as non-standard illiquid contracts 
do not fall within this category. In short, inducing a shift towards more central clearing is a step in the right direction, but 
not enough to fully mitigate systemic risk in OTC derivative markets. By implication, enhancing the safety of bilaterally 
cleared derivatives should remain high on the international policy agenda. A combination of higher capital requirements for 
transactions that are not cleared through a CCP and enhancing transparency through the increased use of trade repositories 
will help achieve this. It needs to be stressed that for all measures to be successful, an internationally consistent approach 
is crucial.  
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